JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. We develop a model of intergenerational co-residence and transfers within the family in a setting of asymmetric information. Following an exchange motive, altruistic parents receive services from their children, who may make them financial gifts in return. However, parents do not know the privacy cost to children of home-sharing. Hence they make additional transfers in order to discipline their children and give them incentives to reveal their true privacy cost. We show that only children who stay at the parental home receive an informational rent, and that this rent is greater for recipients with a low privacy cost.
INTRODUCTION
Intergenerational transfers of income within the family are of central importance in understanding patterns of aggregate capital accumulation and wealth inequality. Whereas a few years ago economic research was especially interested in bequest behaviour, it is now well acknowledged that the bulk of private transfers between the generations occurs inter vivos. An illustration is given by the controversy between Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) , who claim that almost 80% of the US wealth accumulation would be due to intergenerational transfers, and Modigliani (1988) , according to whom life-cycle accumulation accounts for the main share of wealth. A feature of this unsettled debate concerns the motives for private transfers within the family, an issue that has strong implications for the effectiveness of public policies.
The numerous factors that are able to explain the discrepancy between these measures of inherited wealth have been put in a prominent position by Blinder (1988) and Kessler and Masson (1989) . A significant effect relates to the definition of private intergenerational transfers included in the analysis. Indeed, the results that are in favour of the life-cycle hypothesis take account only of bequests and large financial transfers; hence the measure of the share of inherited wealth largely neglects the weight of the other types of inter vivos solidarities. Intergenerational transfers are however an important resource for various family members, since they may affect a variety of behaviours within the family, such as labour supply or geographic location.' Three types of inter vivos assistance can be seen to exist: financial gifts, time-related services (provision of contact and services, care to the elderly), and coresidence.
To date, the numerous theoretical and empirical studies that have attempted to infer the motives behind private transfers have focused especially on transfers in the form of money and to a lesser extent on nonmarket services and attention (see Laferrbre 1999). Conversely, the question of the motives for co-residence between parents and their children has been largely neglected by economists, with a few exceptions (Ermisch 1996;  1. Because of the (quasi-) public good nature of housing services, co-residence is a cheaper mechanism for parents to transfer resources to their children than paying for another independent home. 2. Home-sharing entails a cost to the generations in terms of privacy, each generation having a strong preference to live in an independent home. Two motives for financial transfers from parents to children need to be distinguished. On the one hand, altruistic transfers are explained by the donor's concern for the well-being of the recipient (Becker 1991) , and generations perfectly pool their resources when transfers are strictly positive. On the other hand, the donor may be motivated by an exchange whereby services are expected in return for the financial gifts bestowed, so that the transfer amount can rise with the children's income when the demand of time-related resources by the parents is inelastic (Cox 1987) . Children may also be induced to enter a system of familial loans when their borrowing on the credit market is constrained.2
As we consider housing transfers in the form of co-residence, the few models that have been proposed in the economic literature focus mainly on altruistic feelings within the family. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993, 1994) set out an overlapping-generations model where benevolent parents engage in a non-cooperative game with their children. In a static framework, Dunn and Phillips (1998), Ermisch and Di Salvo (1997) and Wolff (1999) extend the standard altruistic model by including co-residence which corresponds to a pure public good for households, non-housing consumption being a private good.3 Finally, Ermisch (1996) considers a two-period model where parents decide on the level of financial and housing transfers conditional on the human capital investment decisions of their children, motives for transfers being relevant either from altruism or from exchange.
While inter vivos gifts occur prior to the realization of children's earnings, bequests are conversely conditioned on the children's realized income and hence provide incentives for the children to reveal their true ability. Using a model of altruism with endogenous labour supply, Fernandes (2000) proves that the redistributive neutrality property associated with altruistic feelings from parents does not hold when the work effort of children is privately observed. Finally, Cigno et al. (2000) examine the relationship between government and families in an imperfect information setting.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we develop a model of intergenerational transfers that encompasses the three currencies of inter vivos solidarities: money, services and co-residence. Second, drawing on the most recent developments in the economics of the family, we assume asymmetric information between the parents and their children and consider that parents are not perfectly informed about the privacy cost to the offspring entailed by the home-sharing arrangements. Our aim is to get a better understanding of how the pattern of co-residence varies with the characteristics of children. In an altruistic model, it is expected that poorer children are more likely to live with their parents (Dunn and Phillips 1998; Ermisch 1996; Wolff 1999). The assumption of asymmetric information allows us to offer a different explanation for this prediction, relevant from a self-interest perspective rather than from altruistic feelings. Parents are induced to make transfers in order to discipline children and provide them with incentives to reveal their true privacy cost. Hence we prove that only the children who decide to stay at the parental home have the advantage of an informational rent, and that the rent is greater for those recipients characterized by a low privacy cost.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines a basic model of intergenerational transfers along with the notation. It includes the possibility of financial gifts, services and co-residence between parents and children. The full information solution is briefly discussed. In Section II, we assume that the children's cost of privacy involved by the home-sharing arrangement is privately known. Hence, following the theory of incentives contracting, the compensation structure that induces a truthful revelation leads to an informational rent that is derived only by co-resident children. In Section III, we study in greater detail the optimal solutions of the transfers currencies. Concluding comments are presented in Section IV.
I. A MODEL OF PRIVATE TRANSFERS
In this section we examine a theoretical static model of private transfers that accounts for three transfer currencies. We consider a family consisting of two generations, each being represented by only one individual. The parent and the child are, respectively, denoted by subscripts p and k.
Following Becker (1991), we make the assumption that the parent is altruistic. Hence he cares about the well-being of his child. The parental utility also depends on his non-housing private consumption, Cp, and his consumption of housing, H,. Because of altruistic feelings, the parent can enhance the child's level of satisfaction by making a cash transfer T (T > 0). In return, the child provides upstream services S in the form of contact and attention, as described in Cox (1987) In this model, the definition of the budget constraints depends on the coresidence status. We assume that each agent is endowed with a fixed amount of income, Y, and Yk. While Y, does not depend on h, the levels of income Yk and Yi are likely to be different. Indeed, leaving the parental home is associated with greater job opportunities. Rather than having a low income Yck under co-residence, a mobile child may more likely find a job with a higher wage. Job search associated with mobility is an effective mechanism to benefit from high returns of human capital investment, and thus the inequality Y1 > Yc holds. Another interpretation deals with the following sequential decision. First, the child lives with the parent and receives Yc. Then, an attractive job opportunity is proposed to the child, who has to decide whether she will coreside or choose an independent home and receive a higher income.
Let us examine the two cases for h. When the child lives away from the parent (h = i), the constraints are: When the two generations co-reside in the parental home (h = c), the constraints are different:
Ck=-+ TC
The modification in the latter case is related to the public good nature of the housing consumption Hp.6 The child may devote all her income to her private consumption as she derives satisfaction from the parental housing consumption Hp, but in return she will suffer from a privacy cost 0. Using this simple model, we can easily predict how the characteristics of both the parent and the child affect the likelihood of financial and time transfers as well as co-residence.7 For example, the probability of observing a home-sharing arrangement decreases when the child is characterized by a high value of privacy cost. A same result is expected when the utility of extra consumption or extra housing is low, which is more likely for a high income child. Because of the altruistic motive in this model, it is expected that the parent will devote a greater amount of resources in the form of gifts and/or coresidence when the recipient child is in a poor financial situation.
II. CO-RESIDENCE UNDER UNOBSERVABLE PRIVACY COST
We now extend the previous model by relaxing the perfect observability within the family. We assume that the parent does not perfectly know the value of the child's privacy cost 0 entailed by the home-sharing arrangement. In this setting, we use the theory of incentives contracting to prove that a co-resident child benefits from an informational rent given by the parent. As usual in the theory of cost-reimbursement rules (Laffont and Tirole In this setting, the parent's problem is to design a compensation structure that maximizes his expected utility while guarantying the child at least his reservation utility. We define the child's reservation utility as the level of satisfaction that she will obtain if she refuses all future contact with her parents.10 In that case, the child chooses independent residence. Clearly, this level of utility is given by Yk -Hk. This reservation payoff means that no transfers are expected when the child does not accept the contract.
From the literature on incentive contracting and the revelation principle (Laffont and Tirole Because of asymmetric information about the child's privacy cost parameter, the parent is forced to give up a costly rent to the child in the case of a home-sharing arrangement. This informational rent is used to discipline the child into revealing her true cost of privacy entailed by the coresidence.
Proposition 1 gives us two additional pieces of information about the location choice and the subsequent informational rent. On the one hand, we remark that the rent Ro from the parent is a decreasing function of the privacy cost parameter 0. Hence, to be willing to reveal her true type, this result means that the lower 0-type of child must be rewarded with a more important rent value than the higher 0-type. On the other hand, from the monotonicity condition such that q, > 0, this implies that a child with a low privacy cost 0 is characterized by an increased probability of staying at the parental home in order to extract informational rent. Indeed, Ro is a decreasing function in the probability qo of moving away from the parental home.
In this model of intergenerational transfers, therefore, the introduction of asymmetric information between parent and child allows us to suggest a more subtle explanation for why a child in a poor financial situation is more likely to stay at the parental home. Rather than relying on a pure altruistic explanation, whereby the parent provides a greater amount of help to the less well-off child, the model conversely argues in favour of a self-interested motivation, where a child with a low privacy cost is able to extract a greater informational rent. This sets up a strong incentive for a child to behave as if she were forced to live with the parent.13 We now examine in greater detail the optimal solutions for the three transfer currencies.
III. THE PATTERN OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS
To find the components Th and qo (h = i, c) of the optimal implemented contract Me, we have to determine the expected utility function of the parent. We begin by calculation of the expected financial transfer To that depends on the two residence states, which may be expressed as To = (1 -qo)T ++qeT . From Proposition 1, we know that the information rent Ro received by the coresident child is defined by Ro = fo (1 -q(x)) dx. Hence, by integrating by parts, we obtain the following value for the parental expected utility U: In our framework, the location decision does not affect the provision of services by children, and the characterization of the optimal family contract is only a function of the probability of home-sharing (see Proposition 1). Thus, the parent expects a fixed amount of attention conditional on the compensations that he offers to her child. So, the parent and the child implement an efficient exchange. Since the contracted services cannot be used to induce type-revelation, there is no reason to distort the level of attention from its first-best level. The first-order conditions for the expected utility (13) 
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The main implication is that the financial transfer bestowed by the parent does not depend on the true value 0 of the child's privacy cost. When the parent and the child live apart, the condition Ti* = p(S*) means that the gift value is equalized with the compensation entailed by upstream services. Under coresidence, we can write TC* + Yc = 0p(S*) + 9 + (0 -9) + ( Yk -Hk). Now, the child's full income is equalized with the sum of the attention cost, the privacy cost 9, the gain resulting from informational rent (9 -9), and the reservation payoff. 
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have stressed the role of private information in family resource allocation. We propose a model of intergenerational transfers in the currencies of money, time and co-residence between a parent and a child in a setting of asymmetric information. Using the theory of incentives contracting, we show that a child who decides to co-reside receives informational rent from the parent: this occurs because the child has private information about her privacy cost entailed by the home-sharing. A full characterization of the familial choices of transfers is then provided. Following the implemented exchange contract, the informational rent is greater for the co-resident child who has a low privacy cost. Hence leaving the parental home may be seen as a self-selection device. The child effectively benefits from informational rent, provided that she does not move away from her parent, which requires that her privacy cost does not exceed a given threshold.
A question worth addressing is that of the relevancy of our model regarding empirical evidence. The framework that we have developed in this paper seems especially difficult to test. Indeed, in most data-sets, we do not find information concerning the three currencies of intergenerational solidarities, co-residence, gifts and services. Besides, questions related to both time and money transfers are usually put only to parents with non co-resident children; implicitly, it is assumed that parents make regular gifts and receive frequent services from co-resident children. The relevance of asymmetric information could be estimated by observing children's residence decisions and parental transfer responses targeted at exogenous events, such as income losses resulting from involuntary unemployment or disability, suggesting the use of a panel data-set. To the best of our knowledge, there do not exist appropriate data to test our model, and further evidence is needed to understand home-sharing arrangements.
Recently, some studies have argued that imperfect information accounts for many of the patterns of financial intergenerational transfers. Since the neutrality property of the altruism model does not hold (Altonji et al. 1997 ; Wolff 2000), some authors have focused on private information in the context of family transfers.17 In that case, the need to convey incentives to the child causes the redistributive neutrality to break down. Fernandes (2000) finds that the magnitude of the asymmetric information correction factor is substantial when assessing the validity of the redistributive neutrality test. Villanueva (2001) shows that, in the household of a married child, the probability of receiving money responds more to the income of the primary earner than to the income of the secondary earner. Determining whether the assumption of asymmetric information may also be relevant for family residence decisions is an important question left for future research.
Rather than relying on altruism, our model assumes that co-residence is part of an intergenerational exchange within the family, a motive for which there exists empirical support. As noted by Attias-Donfut and Rozenkier (1996), the situation of cohabitation corresponds to one of mutuality, where private assistance must be seen in the context of relations established since childhood. When they become adult, children may stay at the parental home and receive additional financial aid and other support, which helps them to climb the social ladder; but in return they have later to care for aged parents who gain the ongoing presence and time-related assistance of their progeny. Children repay their debt through this intertemporal exchange. The coresidence choice may also convey another benefit: from the material viewpoint, co-resident children often get donations of the parental house (Dunn and 18. Dunn and Phillips (1998) show that the deed to a parent's residence and to other parental property is more likely to be passed to a co-resident child than to a non co-resident child. 19. Parents have the incentives to penalize teenage childbearing of their older daughters to avoid teenage childbearing decisions of their younger daughters when the daughters do not know the parental preferences with certainty. Hence parents treat their daughters differently according to their birth order so as to establish a reputation for preventing teenage childbearing, and they influence the children's behaviour through their choices of intergenerational transfers: the probability that a daughter with a teen birth will receive financial and co-residence support from parents decreases according to the number of daughters remaining at risk.
